Aggregation and Insurance Mortality Estimation by William H. Dow et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We acknowledge funding support from NICHD R01 HD38330. We thank participants at the 2003 Annual Health
Economics Conference and the 2003 Population Association of America annual meetings for helpful comments.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
©2003 by William H. Dow, Kristine A. Gonzalez, and Luis Rosero-Bixby.   All rights reserved. Short sections
of text not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including
© notice, is given to the source.Aggregation and Insurance-Mortality Estimation
William H. Dow, Kristine A. Gonzalez, and Luis Rosero-Bixby
NBER Working Paper No. 9827
July 2003
JEL No. I1, J1
ABSTRACT
One goal of government health insurance programs is to improve health, yet little is known empirically
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As the monetary cost of health care decreases through health insurance, the demand for 
health care increases, potentially improving overall health outcomes.  Many countries around the 
world are promoting health insurance coverage, in part because of these supposed health 
benefits.  Yet, existing literature examining health improvements caused by insurance-induced 
increases in health care utilization is limited, particularly for developing countries.   
One country whose national health insurance plan is frequently cited as a health 
“success” story is Costa Rica.  The country’s health indicators are much higher than other 
countries of a similar income level that do not have national health insurance, with life 
expectancy equivalent to that of the United States, despite a per capita income of one-fifth that of 
the United States.  During the 1970s period when national health insurance was expanded to the 
vast majority of the Costa Rican population, health indicators such as child mortality dropped 
rapidly.  Empirical studies that more closely examined the determinants of that mortality decline 
indicate that expanded access to primary care appeared to play a substantial role (Rosero-Bixby 
1986, 1990).  Of central importance, however, is what role health insurance itself played, as 
distinct from the many other changes in health programs and household behaviors that occurred 
during this period.   
Recent work on Costa Rica’s child mortality decline by Dow and Schmeer (in press) 
focused specifically on the role of health insurance and found that health insurance did not have 
a large causal effect.  But as with most other analyses in this literature, that work was limited by 
its use of aggregated data with an ecological design.  The present paper highlights two major 
implications of this type of aggregation.  First, it widens confidence intervals, and as a result 
Dow and Schmeer (in press) could not rule out moderately sized impacts of insurance on 
  2mortality.  Second, and less recognized but potentially more pernicious, aggregation can amplify 
model mis-specifications such as bias from omitting important confounders. 
The present study advances understanding of the mortality effects of insurance by 
presenting an alternative analysis of the effects of Costa Rica’s national health insurance 
expansion in the 1970s on child mortality.  We first conceptually discuss the potential limitations 
and biases of the common aggregated analysis approach, and explicitly link aggregation to the 
more precisely defined instrumental variables estimator.  We then use Monte Carlo simulation to 
illustrate the nature of the bias from aggregated studies as compared to individual-level and 
instrumental variables approaches.  Finally, by exploiting unique features of Costa Rica’s census 
data we are able to estimate individual-level models, both to compare them to our aggregated 
estimates that parallel previous literature, and to produce more robust estimates of the causal 




Based on a health production framework such as Schultz (1984), insurance is 
hypothesized to reduce child mortality by increasing the demand for medical care.  Mortality of 
child i is a measure of health Hi, and health is a function of medical inputs Mi, non-medical 
health inputs Si (such as sanitation and nutrition) chosen by the household, the health 
environment Ec in community c, and the unobserved health endowment θi: 
(1) H i = H(Mi, Si, Ec, θi) 
Insurance Ii increases medical input demand, which also depends on the community 
health infrastructure Pc (price of quality adjusted medical care, including time dimensions 
  3associated with geographic access), as well as socioeconomic characteristics Wi such as 
household wealth and schooling levels, in addition to health and unobserved preferences πi: 
(2) M i  = M(Ii, Wi, Pc, Hi, πi) 
Non-medical inputs Si depend on similar factors as M, although the cross-price effect of 
insurance may be ignorable: 
(3) S i  = S(Wi, Pc, Hi, πi) 
Finally, insurance may be considered as endogenous to the system, depending on factors 
such as socioeconomic status, health care access barriers, health status, and unobserved 
preferences for medical care: 
(4) I i  = I(Wi, Pc, Hi, πi) 
If insurance is in fact endogenous then it does not enter the reduced form health demand 
function, but instead only enters the quasi-reduced form.  In cases where insurance is exogenous, 
however, the following may instead be interpreted as the reduced form health demand function: 
(5) H i  = H(Ii, Wi, Pc, Ec, θi, πi) 
A complication, however, is that many of the relationships in (5) work in different directions, 
making it often impossible to sign net omitted variables biases in observational data with 
imperfect controls.  For example, adverse selection would imply that less healthy individuals 
would have a higher demand for insurance, causing health to be negatively related to insurance, 
but positive selection of (healthier) higher socioeconomic status persons into positions with 
health insurance could instead cause a positive relationship.  Thus a central implication of this 
model is that it is crucial for empirical research designs to take into account this potential 
endogeneity of insurance.  We next assess previous literature in light of this endogeneity issue. 
  4 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON HEALTH EFFECTS OF INSURANCE 
A wealth of research indicates that health insurance increases health care utilization.  A 
recent Institute of Medicine (2002) report concludes that lack of health insurance is a major 
barrier to health care access in the United States.  The gold standard of studies on the demand 
effects of insurance generosity is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment conducted in the 
United States in the 1970s, which based on a randomized design found that demand did respond 
significantly to the out-of-pocket cost of care, with an elasticity of about –0.2 (Manning et al. 
1987; Keeler and Rolph 1988).  There are fewer studies in developing countries with strong 
causal designs, but literature on health care price elasticities of demand has generally found 
significant elasticities (Jimenez 1995). 
More controversial is the extent to which health outcomes are affected by the type of 
health care induced by insurance-driven decreases in out-of-pocket costs.  A long  literature has 
debated the relative importance of health behaviors, public health interventions, and medical care 
in driving health transitions.  In relation specifically to insurance, the importance of medical care 
is further questioned due to the fact that it is hypothesized that insurance would predominantly 
increase utilization of medical services that have low perceived benefits, while high benefit 
medical services would be more likely to be demanded regardless of insurance status.  An 
additional literature has debated whether insurance instead affects health by creating conditions 
that speed technological change, but this is more relevant in fee-for-service systems at the 
technological frontier such as the United States than in most low-income countries such as Costa 
Rica. 
  5The empirical literature on the health effects of health insurance has been plagued by 
poor methodological designs.  In a recent survey of dozens of studies relating insurance to health 
in the United States, Levy and Meltzer (2001) found only a handful with designs adequate for 
inferring causality.  Based on those they conclude that while insurance is not irrelevant to health, 
in general the health benefits of insurance appear quite small.  Again the gold standard study is 
from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, which found that the extra insurance-induced 
medical care on average had no effect on a wide range of health indicators, although there did 
appear to be some significant effects for certain vulnerable low-income groups (Brook et al. 
1984).  The RAND Health Insurance Experiment, however, was only designed to analyze 
variations in copayment levels within a relatively low catastrophic cap, thus it is not clear how 
generalizable the results are when considering the population that is completely uninsured.  
Other reliable studies identified by Levy and Meltzer (2001) included natural experiment 
analyses of Medicaid expansions indicating that insurance may be relevant for low-income 
groups (Currie and Gruber 1996a, 1996b), and a study indicating that national health insurance 
lowered infant mortality in Canada (Hanratty 1996). 
Within low-income countries there have been very few studies with reliable designs.  
Furthermore, the literature has relied mainly on aggregated estimators.  For example, Dow and 
Schmeer (in press) use a difference-in-difference type design to estimate the effects of Costa 
Rica’s 1970s insurance expansion, but because they use vital statistics data to measure mortality 
they are forced to aggregate to the county as the unit of observation.  In contrast, the present 
study analyzes the same insurance expansion but draws mortality data from census mortality 
questions, allowing direct comparison of individual and aggregated estimators.  To better 
  6interpret this comparison, we next discuss the properties of the common aggregated approach to 
analyzing the insurance effects of mortality. 
 
AGGREGATION 
There is a good deal of confusion among researchers regarding the effects of aggregation 
on estimators.  Robinson’s (1950) article on ecological correlations is still cited reasonably 
frequently to argue that aggregated analyses produce biased results, despite the fact that as early 
as Goodman (1953) it was shown that Robinson’s particular critique did not itself generalize to 
the regression context.  Ever since, however, there have been on-going debates over the merits 
and limitations of aggregated regression estimators (see e.g. Guthrie and Sheppard 2001 for a 
recent debate).   
To clarify the issues in the context of the insurance-mortality literature, we next present 
several precisely specified special cases.  The first case illustrates conditions under which 
individual and aggregated estimators produce identical effects.  The second illustrates the effect 
of omitted group-level confounders, in which case aggregation exacerbates the omitted variables 
bias.  The third assumes an omitted individual-level variable, in which case aggregation may 
ameliorate the resulting bias.  Following Moffitt (1995), we next relate the aggregated model to 
the instrumental variables model, which provides a well-understood framework for comparing 
the estimators.  Monte Carlo analysis is then used to further illustrate each case. 
 
Case I: No aggregation bias 
We begin by specifying an individual-level regression model of health Hic for individual i 
in community c as a function of the individual’s insurance Iic, the individual’s health endowment 
  7θi, community-level health infrastructure Pc, and iid (independently and identically distributed) 
error components µc and εic: 
(6)  ic c c ind ic ind ic ind ind ic P I H ε µ δ θ γ β α + + + + + =  
The insurance coefficient of interest βind is interpreted as the effect on an individual’s health from 
changing their own insurance status.  Next consider an aggregated version of this model with the 
community as the unit of observation, and each individual-level variable replaced by its 
community mean: 
(7)  c c c agg c agg c agg agg c P I H ε µ δ θ γ β α + + + + + =  
The insurance coefficient of interest βagg in this model is interpreted as the aggregate effect on 
community health from increasing the community health insurance rate. 
  There are several points to note in comparing (6) and (7).  First, if (6) is indeed correctly 
specified (appropriate functional forms, no measurement error, error components independent of 
explanatory variables, etc.), then  : the individual-level and the aggregate 
community-level insurance effects are equal.  In this case it is possible to make unbiased cross-
level inferences, such as using the aggregated model (7) to estimate the individual-level 
insurance relationship (6).   
) ˆ ( plim ) ˆ ( plim agg ind β β =
Second, the assumption that the community error component in (6) is independent of 
individual-level insurance implies that the community insurance rate  c I  is appropriately omitted 
from the individual-level model (6).  In the sociology literature this condition has been referred 
to as the absence of cross-level effects (Firebaugh 1978), while in the economics literature this is 
equivalent to assuming no general equilibrium or spillover effects.  In our application, this could 
be interpreted as assuming that the health care supply increases proportionately with the 
community insurance rate; thus as insurance expands, previously insured individuals neither 
  8suffer from additional facility crowding, nor do they benefit from insurance-induced 
technological improvements.   
Third, if the community insurance rate did actually affect individual-level health 
independently of the individual’s insurance status, such that  c indI ξ  was an omitted term from (6), 
then βagg would no longer equal βind, but would instead reflect the net combined effects of βind 
and ξind.  In this case cross-level inferences would be inappropriate. It would be a misnomer to 
refer to this generally as “aggregation bias,” however, since for certain policy purposes of 
evaluating community insurance expansions, the net community effect βagg from the aggregated 
regression (7) may in fact be the quantity of interest. 
Finally, an important drawback of the aggregated model (7) is the fact that the 
aggregation process leads to loss of variation in I, as well as increasing multicollinearity, which 
both result in increased standard errors on the insurance coefficient. 
 
Case II: Aggregation exacerbates omitted variables bias 
  In contrast to the above model that was assumed perfectly specified, in other cases 
aggregation can indeed have pernicious effects on regression coefficients.  An important such 
case that has recently been highlighted by Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1996) occurs when 
community-level confounders are omitted from the model.  Continuing the example of Case I, 
assume that (6) and (7) are now modified such that the community-level health infrastructure 
variable Pc is omitted from the estimation.  Denote the insurance coefficients from these models 






0 ≠ ind δ , that it is correlated with the insurance variable of interest,  0 ) , cov( ≠ c ic P I , 
  9but that Pc is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables.  The bias from omitting Pc can then 
be characterized in the individual-level equation as: 
(8) 
) var( / ) , cov(
) var( / ) , cov(
ic c c ind










and in the aggregated equation as: 
(9)  ) var( / ) , cov( c c c agg agg
OVcomm
agg I P I δ β β = − . 
The key difference between (8) and (9) is that the variance of the insurance variable is smaller in 
the aggregated equation, implying that the omitted variables bias will be larger in the aggregated 
model than in the individual-level model.  Thus with an unobserved community-level 
confounder, aggregation exacerbates omitted variables bias.  
 
Case III: Aggregation ameliorates omitted variables bias 
  It is not always true though that aggregation exacerbates omitted variables bias.  Consider 
instead an alternative extreme example in which the only mis-specification is an omitted 
individual-level variable, such as an individual’s genetic health endowment  ic θ .  Assume that 
0 ) , cov( ≠ ic ic I θ , such that the version of the individual level model that omits  ic θ  yields a biased 




In addition, for expositional purposes assume that although  ic θ  varies across individuals 
within a community, its community mean value  c θ  does not vary across communities.  This is 
plausible for a variable such as the genetic health endowment.  The result of this assumption is 
that there is essentially no variation in  c θ  left to be correlated with  c I , implying that the 
aggregated estimation with this particular omitted individual-level variable still yields unbiased 
  10estimates of the insurance effect:  .  Although this is an extreme example, and 
the result will not hold for other individual-level variables that do vary at the community level, it 
illustrates the important point that when omitted variables vary more at the individual-level than 
at the community-level, aggregation can ameliorate omitted variables bias. 
ind agg
OV
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Aggregation and Instrumental Variables 
  This third case also helps illustrate the close relationship between aggregated estimators 
and instrumental variables estimators.  Consider an individual-level instrumental variables model 
in which insurance  is treated as an endogenous variable due to correlation with the error term 
arising from omitted individual-level variable 
ic I
.  One potential instrument set would be a 
vector of community dummiesD
~
, resulting in a first stage equation: 
(10)  10 10 , 10
~ ~
c c c ic P D I δ υ α + + =  
and a second stage structural equation: 
(11)    IV ic IV IV ic P I H ˆ δ β α + + =
The central point to note about (10) is that the predicted value   is essentially equal to 
the community insurance rate 
ic I ˆ
c I  (with an innocuous adjustment for  ).  The implication of this 
is that this instrumental variables estimator will be unbiased under very similar conditions as was 
necessary for the aggregated estimator to be unbiased in Case III:  First, there must be 
community level variation in the insurance rate.  Second, in order for the community dummies to 
be valid instruments, there must be no omitted community-level variables in the error term of the 
structural equation (11); this estimator will only help correct for certain omitted individual-level 
variables.  One requirement of this latter condition is that in Case III, there is no community-
c P
  11level variation in  c θ  (the aggregated individual variables) that affects health.  Another important 
requirement of the latter condition is that the community mean insurance rate  c I  must have no 
independent effect on individual health in (6) after controlling for the individual-level insurance: 
0 = ind ξ .  In other words, this instrumental variables estimator will only be valid if there are no 
general equilibrium (cross-level) effects of insurance. 
  One reason why it is useful to compare the aggregated estimator to the instrumental 
variables estimator is that it enables the use of well understood specification tests for choosing 
between alternative models.  In particular, the Hausman endogeneity test can be used for judging 
whether estimates from instrumental variables models using grouped variation (similar to the 
aggregated models) are significantly different from OLS (individual-level) estimates.   
One limitation to this testing approach is that if the Hausman endogeneity test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the estimates are equal, it may not be possible to distinguish between 
alternative causes of the rejection: (a) Rejection could be due to the presence of general 
equilibrium or cross-level effects.  In this case the aggregated estimates could only be interpreted 
as reflecting the net aggregate community-level health effects of insurance expansion; 
furthermore, the individual-level models should be re-specified to include community insurance 
rates as an additional covariate.  (b) Rejection could indicate omitted community-level variables, 
in which case both individual and aggregated estimators would be biased, but the bias would be 
exacerbated in the latter.  (c) Rejection could indicate omitted individual-level variables, in 
which case both estimators are again likely to be biased, but the relative sizes of the bias is more 
ambiguous.  If the bias is caused by variables that have a stronger correlation with insurance at 
the individual-level than at the community level, such as in Case III, then the aggregated 
estimator will have the smaller bias, but this will generally be difficult to discern. 
  12  The Hausman endogeneity test result is perhaps more useful in this context when it does 
not reject (assuming reasonable confidence intervals).  In this case there is some small chance 
that individual and aggregated estimators are truly different but they are biased in such a way 
that they appear to coincide.  However, this is a lower probability event.  Instead it may be more 
reasonable to infer from non-rejection that there are no significant biases and that there are no 
general equilibrium or cross-level effects, and thus that aggregated estimators could indeed be 
used to make either aggregate or individual-level inferences.  
 
Monte Carlo Illustration of Aggregation 
  Monte Carlo simulation is a useful tool for illustrating the previous points comparing 
individual-level, aggregated, and instrumental variables estimators for each of the three cases 
discussed above.  To conduct this simulation we begin by assuming a true model reflected by 
equation (6), and then design the data generating process to reflect the characteristics of the 
actual Costa Rican data analyzed further below.  In each of 100 communities we draw 
variables  and   from a multivariate standard normal distribution with correlation 0.5, and an 
iid standard normal community error component
c I c P
c µ .  We next create 100 individual observations 
in each community, and then draw variables  and  i I ic θ  from a multivariate standard normal 
distribution with correlation 0.5, and an iid normal individual error component ic ε  with standard 
deviation 10.  To complete the model, we generate the individual-level insurance 
variable , and the dependent variable  c I + i I = ic I ic c c ic ic P I ic H ε µ θ + + + + = .  Thus individual-
level insurance   is correlated with both the health endowment  ic I ic θ  and the community 
  13infrastructure  , and the true coefficients on these variables all equal one:  c P
, 1 1 , 1 = = = = = = agg ind agg ind agg ind δ δ γ γ β β .   
c θ
Estimates of the true models are shown in Table 1 columns [10]-[12], averaged over 500 
replications.  The individual-level model (6) reported in column [10] was estimated by OLS; the 
standard errors in all of the OLS models were adjusted for the community-level error component 
using Huber-type ex-post clustered corrections.  The aggregated model (7) in column [11] was 
estimated for 100 communities after collapsing each variable to its community mean; note that 
the standard error of the coefficient on  is quite large, reflecting the fact that this variable was 
designed to have no variation when aggregated to the community-level.  The instrumental 
variables estimator of the true model (equation 11 modified to also include  ic θ  in both stages) in 
column [12] uses the vector of 100 community dummy variables as instrument in the first stage; 
standard errors are again corrected for community-level clustering. 
The true models [10]-[12] illustrate two central results corresponding to Case I: First, 
when there is no mis-specification (and no general equilibrium or cross-level effects), all three 
estimators yield exactly the same point estimates.  Aggregated estimators are unbiased in this 
case, and can be used for inferring either the aggregate health effects of an insurance expansion, 
or the equivalent individual-level effect of insurance on health.  Second, the standard errors of 
the insurance coefficient are substantially higher in models that discard individual-level variation 
in insurance (either by aggregating the unit of observation to the community-level, or by using 
only community-level instruments). 
  Next, consider the results of Case II in columns [4]-[6], in which the community level 
health infrastructure variable   is omitted from the models.  The key result is that while the 
individual-level estimator is biased up 29%, this bias is 50% in the aggregated estimator.  In this 
c P
  14case, aggregation exacerbates the omitted variables bias.  Furthermore, the instrumental variables 
estimator is just as biased as the aggregated estimator; this is due to the fact that the omitted 
community-level variable is in the error term of the structural equation, hence the community 
dummies are not appropriate instruments since they are not validly excluded from the structural 
equation. 
  Finally, consider Case III in columns [7]-[9], in which the individual-level health 
endowment variable  ic θ  is omitted from the models.  In this case the individual-level OLS 
insurance coefficient is again biased by 30%, but the aggregated estimator remains unbiased.  
This is because  ic θ  was constructed to illustrate the special case of a variable that is correlated 
with insurance at the individual-level, but not at the community-level.  Another way of viewing 
this example is that individual insurance choices are endogenous within communities, but that 
variation in insurance rates across communities is caused solely by exogenous factors, and in this 
case community-level dummies can serve as appropriate instruments to correct for this 
endogeneity. 
  The above has necessarily focused on stylized examples to illustrate some important but 
frequently poorly understood properties of aggregated estimators.  One of the implications of this 
discussion is that a priori it is difficult to hypothesize whether or not aggregated models will 
perform well in any given application, but that Hausman tests provide a useful tool for assessing 
the relative performance of the estimators.  Next, we apply the above insights to examining the 
mortality effect of insurance in the particular context of Costa Rica’s 1970’s insurance 
expansion. 
 
  15COSTA RICAN SETTING 
Infant mortality rates fell dramatically in Costa Rica over the course of the 1960s and 
1970s, dropping from approximately 70 per 1,000 in 1960 to 20 by 1980.  Much of this decline 
was in deaths from diarrhea, pneumonia, and vaccine-preventable diseases.  Caldwell (1986) has 
argued that important factors causing this decline include high levels of female education, a 
strong primary care focus in the health care system, and the role of national health insurance in 
eliminating financial barriers to health care access.  Additional factors hypothesized by other 
observers include water supply and sanitation interventions, advanced social development, 
sustained economic growth, and political stability (Mohs 1985; PAHO 1998).  These factors 
were likely reinforced by the sharp fertility decline during the 1960s, which itself may have been 
caused by many of these same factors. 
The factor that has received the most attention out of the above list has been Costa Rica’s 
health care policies.  For the purposes of the present paper we distinguish the national health 
insurance expansion during the 1970s from the other potentially important primary and 
secondary care interventions.  While previous empirical work has documented that the policies 
as a whole appear to have played a substantial role in reducing infant and child mortality 
(Rosero-Bixby 1986), the only paper to look specifically at insurance has found its role to be 
modest at best (Dow and Schmeer, in press). 
Mesa-Lago (1985) documents the evolution of national health insurance in Costa Rica.  
Prior to the 1970s health insurance was primarily held by civil servants and professionals, with 
very low coverage rates among agricultural workers and other laborers, despite a 1961 
constitutional amendment to establish universal coverage.  A key turning point was the 
development of the first national health plan in 1971, which reinvigorated the goal of universal 
  16public health insurance.  With political support from the government, insurance rates began to 
climb rapidly starting about 1973, leveling off about 1980 when the third world debt crisis 
began.  Based on census data, health insurance coverage among children increased from 42% in 
1973 to 73% by 1984.  Those remaining uninsured were generally in marginalized households 
with only unemployed or informal sector workers; in principle the most indigent households 
were eligible for user fee and premium exemptions, but in practice many households are not 
covered by these safety net provisions.  The 30% of the population who obtained insurance as a 
result of the 1970s expansion were generally in middle to lower socioeconomic status 
households, who could reasonably be expected to benefit from improved financial access to care.  
This change in financial access is likely to have been substantial, given that insurance granted 
universal access to hospitals and widespread health facilities at zero prices with no deductibles, 
as opposed to the uninsured who faced large out-of-pocket prices and user fees even in 
government-run facilities. 
Concurrent with the insurance expansion were a number of other health sector changes.  
First, primary health care programs targeted at the uninsured were initiated in selected rural areas 
in 1973, and expanded to certain urban neighborhoods in 1976.  Second, virtually all hospitals 
were nationalized in the mid-1970s and placed under the control of the government agency that 
administers universal insurance, the Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social.  Third, the government 
invested in a considerable expansion of primary health care personnel and facilities.  
Consideration of these other health sector changes is important in our empirical analysis in part 
because they may be correlated at the community level with insurance rate changes, and hence 
should be controlled for in the regression analyses.  In addition, these changes may affect the 
likelihood of general equilibrium or cross-level effects of insurance.  For example, if the supply 
  17side of the health care market does not expand sufficiently to meet the new demand induced by 
an insurance expansion, then facility crowding could result in spillovers that cause individual-
level insurance effect estimates to be larger than the net community-level effects from 
aggregated analyses.  The fact that the government did expand health care supply along with 
insurance lessens the likelihood of such general equilibrium effects.  We next discuss in more 
detail our econometric methods. 
 
METHODS 
We analyze the effects of Costa Rica’s insurance expansion using variants of all three of 
the econometric estimators discussed earlier: individual-level OLS, aggregated OLS, and 
individual-level instrumental variables with community dummy instruments.  Equation (6) 
showed a stylized version of our estimating equation derived from the reduced form health 
demand function (5).  When moving from simulations to actual data, however, we must address 
several omitted variables issues arising from unobservables.   
First, although we can explicitly control for individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics 
and wealth Wic, and certain non-medical inputs such as water supply and sanitation Sic, our data 
do not allow us to observe other individual characteristics such as health endowments  ic θ .  If 
these unobserved health variables are in the error term then adverse or positive selection could 
cause insurance to be endogenous, leading to biased estimates.  To attempt to test for this we will 
use the instrumental variables estimator; if the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity, then we will conclude that in our application insurance is not in fact endogenous.   
Second, our instrumental variables strategy allows us to test for the exogeneity of other 
potentially endogenous variables as well, such as wealth, and water supply and sanitation.  
  18Although non-medical health inputs such as sanitation may not belong in the reduced form health 
demand equation per se, given our quasi-experimental design it is useful to include such 
variables in the model simply as controls for unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated 
with insurance preferences.  Such controls would not properly serve their purpose if they were 
themselves endogenous, however, hence the importance of Hausman tests for their exogeneity. 
Third, we are likely to only partially observe important community-level variables such 
as the community health environment Ec.  As discussed above, this would cause exacerbated 
omitted variables bias in the aggregated and instrumental variables models due to correlation 
between insurance and the community error component µc.  A fix to this could be to estimate 
community-fixed effects versions of the model; however, with cross-sectional data this would 
only be possible for the individual-level OLS model.  Thus our solution to this problem is to 
construct a synthetic panel dataset, based on repeated cross-sections of the Costa Rican national 
census just before (1973) and after (1984) the main insurance expansion, which then allows all 
three estimators to control for unobserved community-level fixed effects. 
These modifications result in the following estimation version of the individual-level 
equation (6), where t indexes year Y  (1973 or 1984): 
(12)  12 , 12 , 12 12 12 12 12
~ ~
ict c c t ct ict ict ict D Y P W I H ε υ η δ λ β α + + + + + + =  
Our estimating equation for the aggregated model is the same as (12), but with individual-level 
variables being replaced by the year-specific community mean: 
(13)  13 , 13 , 13 13 13 13 13
~ ~
ct c c t ct ct ct ct D Y P W I H ε υ η δ λ β α + + + + + + =  
It is worth noting that this aggregated estimator (13) is analogous to the state-year fixed 
effects “difference-in-difference” models used by a number of United States studies which Levy 
and Meltzer (2001) have referred to as producing some of the more valid estimates of insurance 
  19effects on health.  This is also the model used by Dow and Schmeer (in press) in the only other 
work analyzing the effects of the Costa Rican insurance expansion. 
For the instrumental variables model, with communities observed in multiple years the 
instrument set is expanded to consist of the year-specific community dummies.  Thus after 
including community fixed effects in the main equation (12), the model is identified by the 
community × year interaction terms.  This produces instrumental variables estimates that again 
correspond quite closely to the difference-in-differences aggregated model (13).  The first stage 
equation is: 
(14)  14 , 14 , 14 , 14 14 14 14
~ ~ ~ ~
ict c t c c c t ct ict ict D Y D Y P W I ε ς υ η δ λ α + × + + + + + =  
and the second stage structural equation is the same as (12) after substituting the predicted value 
 from (14) for  .  ict I ˆ
ict I
An additional econometric detail is that the aggregated estimator is implemented via 
OLS, weighted by the community population size.  Finally, Huber-type community-clustered 




Data linking individual-level insurance and mortality outcomes are rare, which is one 
reason why many studies resort to aggregated analyses.  In this study we are able to analyze 
100% microsamples of the 1973 and 1984 Costa Rican censuses, exploiting their unique feature 
of asking each woman not only about the survivorship of her children, but also her health 
insurance status.  Although ideally we would prefer to observe the mortality experience of each 
child, we only actually observe child mortality based on the mothers’ reports of total children 
ever born and surviving, thus we follow previous literature such as Trussell and Preston (1982) 
  20and estimate the determinants of infant and child mortality using mothers as the units of 
observation. 
The main insurance expansion occurred between 1973 and 1980.  Thus although we do 
not have historical insurance information on each woman, in general insurance rates for women 
were stable over the several years prior to each of these censuses.  To focus on the mortality only 
of recently born children, for whom current insurance measured in the census is plausibly an 
indicator of insurance at the time of birth, we restrict our analysis sample to women ages 18 to 
25.  In addition, because of high non-response to the “children ever born” question among single 
women, we restrict the sample to only ever married women.  Finally, the sample is further 
restricted to only those women who reported at least one live birth, resulting in an analysis 
sample of 134,036 women (53,196 from the 1973 census and 80,840 from the 1984 census). 
 
Dependent Variable 
Our child mortality dependent variable H is constructed from two standard census 
questions regarding the number of live births a woman has ever had (B), and how many of those 
children are still alive (L):  .  This dependent variable raises a number of analysis 
issues.  First, in order to make results generalizable to the population of children, rather than the 
population of mothers, regressions are modified to incorporate weights reflecting each woman’s 
number of children ever born.   
B L B H / ) ( − =
Second, there is likely to be some degree of under-reporting of births and deaths, 
particularly for live-born children who died in the immediate postpartum period.  A study of 
national child national estimates from these census data found that the 1973 census results in 
unbiased estimates, but the 1984 census slightly overestimates child mortality (Behm and 
  21Robles-Soto 1990).  Furthermore, it is possible that such under-reporting could differ for home-
births and hospital births, which could introduce bias given that the insurance expansion is 
associated with a decrease in home births.  Unfortunately the patterns of such under-reporting are 
not well understood either in general or in our specific data, thus we simply raise this as a 
potential caveat (a caveat that also applies to alternative data sources including vital statistics that 
imperfectly observe in-home mortality).  
Third, mortality will increase with age because of the greater average number of child 
years of risk exposure.  Trussell and Preston (1982) have developed methods to adjust the 
mortality dependent variable for exposure time; their methods are particularly useful for making 
inferences about formal mortality rates in samples with wide age ranges.  For our purposes of 
regression estimation among a narrow age group, however, we prefer the less parametric 
alternative method of simply correcting for exposure by including women’s age as a right-hand 
side explanatory variable. 
Fourth, it is not self-evident to which time period and child's age this mortality ratio 
refers.  However, early studies by William Brass and other demographers suggest that child 
mortality ratios of mothers aged 18 to 24 stand approximately for the probability of dying in the 




The main explanatory variable of interest is insurance status.  Crucially, both the 1973 
and 1984 Costa Rican censuses collect data on social health insurance status for each household 
member.  Because children generally have the same insurance status as their mother, the 
  22mother’s insurance status is a good indicator of both whether a woman had access to insured 
health care during pregnancy and childbirth, and whether the child had access to insured health 
care after birth. 
The census also provides a rich array of individual and household-level control variables 
corresponding to the constructs in the reduced form health demand equation (5).  The specific 
variables included in the analysis are further defined in Table 2.  The mothers’ demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics Wi controlled for in the analysis include age, educational 
attainment, migration status, and wealth.  The final set of household-level variables, included in 
the model as controls for unobserved heterogeneity correlated with insurance, are three water 
supply and sanitation measures. 
Most of these variables are self-explanatory, with the exception of wealth.  Wealth is 
represented in the estimation as the first two principal components from a vector of eleven 
housing quality and asset indicators.  The first wealth principal component can be interpreted as 
a wealth measure; the factor loadings on the second component make it more difficult to 
interpret, but we include it in the model as an additional control variable.  These indicators are 
reduced to their principal components because of the degrees of freedom and multicollinearity 
challenges arising in the aggregated models; the individual-level models, however, are not 
substantively changed when instead including the eleven underlying variables directly. 
The last set of variables in the model are those that measure community-level health 
infrastructure.  These are not directly available from the censuses in Costa Rica, hence they have 
been constructed from a variety of different survey and administrative data sources.  These 
include travel time to the capital city San Jose, the community proportion of individuals covered 
by the post-1973 primary health care programs targeted at the uninsured, the community 
  23proportion of the population whose nearest health clinic was inaugurated between 1973 and 
1984, and finally the proportion of deaths not medically certified is used as another proxy 
variable for community access to care. 
An additional key variable required for the analysis is the definition of communities.  
Extensive previous effort has been applied to this problem by Rosero-Bixby (1991), resulting in 
the country being broken into a set of 99 mutually exclusive “counties” that are both 
geographically and politically meaningful.  This county grouping is applied in the present paper 
as the definition of the community, and the community-level health infrastructure control 




  Summary statistics for the insured and uninsured women in each of our two data years 
are presented in Table 3.  Insurance coverage rates among our sample women increased 
dramatically between 1973 and 1984, from 46% to 74%.  During the same period our child 
mortality ratio fell even more markedly, from 53 to 18 deaths per 1000 live births.  The 
association between the insurance expansion and the national mortality drop has been noted by 
many observers (e.g., Mesa-Lago 1985), but of course many other health determinants improved 
over this time period as well.  For example, the proportion of women ages 18-25 with any 
secondary education doubled from 20% to 41%, the proportion of women living in households 
without internal bathrooms dropped in half from 42% to 19%, and the proportion of women 
living in households with a refrigerator doubled from 19% to 41% (Table 3). 
  While the above results refer to the aggregate national level relationship, we see that at 
the county level the relationship between the size of the insurance change and the size of the 
  24mortality change over time is also large, before controlling for potential confounders.  This can 
be seen from the OLS aggregated regression in Table 4 column [2] that includes year and county 
fixed effects but no other control variables (this regression is equivalent to a “difference-in-
differences” design).  The coefficient from this regression indicates that the 29 percentage point 
insurance expansion explains (before adding controls) 40% of the observed child mortality 
decline between the 1973 and 1984 censuses ( 4 . ) 018 . 053 /(. 29 . 0485 . = − × − ).   
This county-level aggregated effect is almost four times higher, however, than the 
unconditional individual-level relationship shown in Table 4 column [1].  The standard error of 
the insurance variable in the aggregated model is also much higher than in the individual model, 
by a factor of 10.  In order to further compare the different results between these models, Table 4 
column [3] reports the individual-level instrumental variables regression that uses the 98 
county×year interaction dummies for identification.  The test of the joint explanatory power of 
these instruments in the first stage is highly significant (as is the joint significance test for the 
base county fixed effects dummies), implying that the instruments are strong enough to avoid 
weak-instrument bias.  As was illustrated in the Monte Carlo results from Table 1, when using 
our actual data the estimated insurance coefficient from the instrumental variables model turns 
out to be quite similar to the estimate from the aggregated model, in both size and precision.  
Furthermore, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instrumental variable estimate 
(and by implication the aggregated estimate) is statistically equal to the individual-level estimate. 
  As discussed earlier, there are multiple potential reasons why the Hausman test could 
reject the equality of the individual and the aggregated estimates.  This could be due to the 
presence of general equilibrium or cross-level effects that cause the estimators to estimate 
different underlying constructs, it could be due to omitted community-level variables which 
  25result in exacerbated omitted variables bias in the aggregated estimator, or it could be due to 
omitted individual-level variables that may cause insurance to be endogenous in the individual-
level model. 
  Given that we do in fact observe a rich array of individual and community-level control 
variables, we can further explore the relative inferences from individual versus aggregated 
models by next considering estimates that include this complete set of controls.  Table 4 column 
[4] presents this individual-level OLS model, indicating that the insurance effect drops by half 
after including controls, but is still statistically significantly different from zero.  Control 
covariates that also significantly affect child mortality in this model include mother’s education, 
water supply and sanitation, and household wealth.  Community health care infrastructure 
indicators are less significantly related to child mortality, though not irrelevant. 
  When next considering the aggregated results with the full set of controls (Table 4 
column [5]), the key finding is that the insurance coefficient drops to virtually zero.  Based on 
the above theoretical discussion of omitted variables bias in aggregated models, this suggests that 
the correlation between insurance and these controls may have operated mostly at the community 
level, hence their omission led to a much larger omitted variables bias in the aggregated model 
than in the individual-level model. 
  In terms of standard errors, Table 4 indicates that with controls the aggregated model still 
yields standard errors on the insurance coefficient that are an order of magnitude larger than the 
individual-level model.  Furthermore, virtually all of the control variables are statistically 
insignificant in the aggregated model, arising from some combination of reduced variation and 
multicollinearity.  Based on the fact that the insurance standard errors in the aggregated model 
  26changed little after adding the control variables, however, it does not appear that the insurance 
coefficient itself was influenced by multicollinearity. 
  Again the instrumental variables model can assist in formally testing the difference 
between aggregated and individual-level results.  Comparing models with controls, the 
instrumental variables model (Table 4 column [6], which treats only insurance as endogenous) is 
again quite similar to the aggregated model in terms of both the insurance coefficient and its 
standard error, and hence has much larger standard errors than the individual-level model.  The 
exogenous controls in the instrumental variables model, however, have virtually the same 
coefficients and precision as the individual-level model, given that these exploit the same level 
of variation (this result was also found in the Monte Carlo simulation of Table 1).  Formally 
comparing these models with controls, the Hausman test now fails to reject the null hypothesis 
that the instrumental variables and individual-level OLS models are equivalent.  This is true 
whether including all controls in this Hausman test, or running the Hausman test on the insurance 
variable alone.   
As one final test, we explored a second instrumental variables model that additionally 
treated the wealth and water supply and sanitation variables as endogenous (using the same set of 
county×year instrumental variables as used to instrument insurance alone).  One interpretation of 
this model is that these potentially endogenous control variables now rely only on their 
community-level variation to control for confounding.  The results of this model (Table 4 
column [7]) are virtually identical to the previous instrumental variables model that treated only 
insurance as endogenous.  The Hausman tests again cannot reject the null hypothesis that these 
variables are jointly exogenous, or that the insurance variable alone is unaffected by their 
endogeneity.  This suggests that these variables appear mainly to be controlling for community-
  27level confounding, which again would explain why the aggregated model appeared to be much 
more biased by their omission than did the individual-level model. 
 
DISCUSSION 
  The result of the above model comparisons and tests is that the OLS individual-level 
specification with controls (and community fixed effects) is our preferred model (Table 4 
column [4]).  Furthermore, unless there happen to be countervailing remaining biases in the 
various models, the results suggest that insurance is not endogenous in this preferred model after 
including controls, and that there were no general equilibrium or cross-level effects of the 
insurance expansion.  This implies that the aggregated model with controls (Table 4 column [5]) 
would also yield unbiased effects that could be interpreted at either the aggregated or individual 
levels.   
However, this aggregated model with controls is substantially inferior due to its larger 
confidence intervals.  When comparing the upper bound (in absolute value) of the 95% 
confidence intervals on the insurance effect, the models yield somewhat different inferences.  
The point estimate of insurance in the individual model implies that the 1970s insurance 
expansion explained only 4% of Costa Rica’s marked child mortality drop between 1973 and 
1984, and the 95% confidence interval can bound this effect to be under 6%.  By contrast, the 
95% confidence interval from the aggregated model can only bound this effect to be under 16%, 
which would not be an insubstantial intervention.
1  Translating these effects into more 
generalizable magnitudes, the individual-level point estimates imply an insurance-mortality 
                                                 
1 This estimate compares quite closely to Dow and Schmeer (in press).  Based on vital statistics data on all births in 
1973 and 1984, the aggregated estimates in that paper bounded the insurance effect to explain at most 20% of Costa 
Rica’s infant mortality drop over this period.  This suggests that sample limitations in the present paper to estimate 
mortality for all children of only ever married women 18-25 did not lead to substantial biases. 
  28elasticity of -0.10 with an upper bound of -0.14, as compared to the aggregated upper bound 
elasticity of -0.37.  Although not radically different in this application after controlling for a rich 
set of observed confounders, the difference is indeed substantive.   
Furthermore, based on the fact that the individual and aggregated estimates were 
radically different before controlling for confounders, our results do suggest the importance of 
careful investigation of the effects of aggregation in any given application.  As emphasized in 
our theoretical consideration of the effects of aggregation, however, it would be a mistake to 
blindly assume that aggregated estimators always yield more biased estimates than individual-
level estimators.  One reason for interpreting aggregation as equivalent to an instrumental 
variables estimator is to further emphasize the point that aggregation is not in and of itself 
uniformly dangerous.  As with instrumental variables techniques, aggregated estimators have 
their place, with the same inherent possibilities for use and abuse.  Every estimator has its 
strengths and weaknesses, and applications that carefully compare across different levels of 
aggregation may often prove the most convincing. 
Based on our analysis, we conclude that although insurance does have a statistically 
significant effect on child mortality, this effect is quite small.  If all else had been held constant 
from 1973 to 1984 except for the insurance intervention, instead of the actual child mortality 
drop from 53 to 18 deaths per 1000 live births, Costa Rica’s mortality would have dropped to 
only 51.6.  As a health intervention, expanding insurance coverage from 46% to 74% of our 
population did not have much effect on child mortality.   
There are a number of potential reasons why the insurance expansion might have been 
ineffective.  For example, it could be that the treated group who became newly insured in fact 
already had complete access to care even before the expansion, hence the insurance did not affect 
  29utilization but operated only as a financing intervention.  However, we find this explanation 
unconvincing a priori, given that in settings throughout the world health care user fees have been 
found to lower utilization (Jimenez 1995).  We believe it is plausible that a substantial portion of 
the large increase in national health care expenditures over this period could have been induced 
by the price-effects of insurance.   
A second potential explanation of the lack of insurance effects is that the particular types 
of medical care induced by insurance had very little effect on child mortality outcomes.  
Economic insurance theory predicts that uninsured individuals will be willing to pay out-of-
pocket for the most cost-effective types of health care, hence insurance will increase utilization 
primarily for less effective health care interventions that are not worth their full cost.  For 
example, if insurance primarily induces increases in expensive hospitalization, and if the 
available hospital quality and technology yields relatively low health benefits, then although 
insurance might have effects on selected health outcome measures, the insurance expansions 
might not have major effects on aggregate health indicators such as mortality.  Further research 
on the exact types of health care demand induced by insurance would be particularly useful for 
further exploring these issues. 
Also important will be to conduct similar analyses on the health effects of insurance in a 
wider range of settings.  Generalizability of individual studies can always be questioned due to 
specific institutional features.  For example, the fact that Costa Rica made available a wide range 
of primary health care interventions regardless of insurance status may have contributed to a 
smaller estimated effect of insurance than would be found in another setting that expanded 
insurance prior to investing in expanded primary care programs.  This of course begs the 
question of whether such primary care programs would be more cost-effective at achieving 
  30health gains, if costly insurance programs appear to have little mortality benefit beyond these 
primary care programs.  Clearly additional research is needed to better explore these and related 
questions, such as the value of insurance in reducing the risk of catastrophic expenditures as 
compared with the opportunity cost of insurance expansions crowding out alternative potentially 
more effective health interventions. 
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 Table 1: Monte Carlo Simulations of Effects of Omitting Individual and Community Level Controls 
Variable Name
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV
Indiv Aggreg Indiv Indiv Aggreg Indiv Indiv Aggreg Indiv Indiv Aggreg Indiv
Insurance 1.504 1.499 1.499 1.286 1.496 1.496 1.294 1.005 1.005 1.005 0.999 0.999
(.096) (.168) (.164) (.107) (.169) (.164) (.092) (.166) (.161) (.0994) (.166) (.161)
Individual Health 0.862 0.718 0.757 1.003 0.996 1.005
(.114) (1.690) (.131) (.112) (1.45) (.129)
Community Infrastructure 0.859 1.002 1.002 1.003 1.006 1.005
(.148) (.166) (.160) (.147) (.166) (.160)
Notes:
1. "OLS Indiv" are individual-level models estimated by OLS using 10,000 observations (100 individuals in each of 100 communities).
2. "OLS Aggreg" are community-level models estimated by OLS using 100 observations on community mean values.
3. "IV Indiv" are individual-level instrumental variables models using 10,000 observations, with 99 community dummies as instruments.
4. Individual-level OLS and IV models report Huber community-clustered standard errors.




Child mortality Number of children died / children ever born 0.032 0.126
Kids ever born Number of children ever born 2.025 1.213
Kids currently alive Number of children currently alive 1.927 1.111
Independent variables
Individual characteristics
   Insurance Dummy = 1 if woman has health insurance coverage 0.631 0.483
   Age Age of woman in years 22.289 2.100
   Educational Attainment 
     None (omitted) Dummy = 1 if no education 0.044 0.205
     Primary education Dummy = 1 if primary education only 0.625 0.484
     Secondary education Dummy = 1 if secondary or higher education 0.331 0.470
   Migration status Dummy = 1 if woman has migrated in the past 5 years 0.247 0.431
Household sanitation characteristics
   No sanitation Dummy = 1 if household does not have own sanitation 0.186 0.389
   No bath Dummy = 1 if household does not have own bathroom  0.281 0.449
   No water Dummy = 1 if household does not have own piped water 0.336 0.472
Wealth indicators 
     Cement roof Dummy = 1 if household has cement roof 0.039 0.194
     Wood or tile floor Dummy = 1 if household has wood or tile floor 0.675 0.468
     Cement or brick walls Dummy = 1 if household has cement or brick walls 0.233 0.422
     Electric light Dummy = 1 if household has electric lighting 0.722 0.448
     No light Dummy = 1 if household does not have any lighting 0.029 0.168
     Electric or gas cooking fuel Dummy = 1 if household has electric or gas cooking fuel 0.499 0.500
     Stove Dummy = 1 if household has a stove 0.600 0.490
     Refrigerator Dummy = 1 if household has a refrigerator 0.322 0.467
     Radio and television Dummy = 1 if household has radio and/or televesion 0.822 0.383
     Telephone Dummy = 1 if household has a telephone 0.099 0.299
Variable Name Description Mean      Household density Number of persons per room in household 1.424 1.006
   Wealth1 First principle component of wealth indicators 0.306 1.830
   Wealth2 Second principle component of wealth indicators -0.037 1.149
Community characteristics
   Travel time to San Jose Travel time to San Jose (capital city), hours 3.230 3.021
   Primary health care programs Proportion of population covered by post-1973  0.357 0.343
primary health care programs
   Nearest clinic opened after 1973 Proportion of population with nearest clinic   0.225 0.349
inaugurated since 1973 
   Deaths not certified Proportion of deaths not medically certified  0.164 0.202
Number of observations
Notes:
1. All data except community characteristics are drawn from the 1973 and 1984 Costa Rican censuses.
2. Wealth1 and Wealth2 are the first two principle components of cement roof, floor, cement or brick walls, electric
    light, no light, electric or gas cooking fuel, no stove, no refrigerator, no radio or tv, no telephone and household 
   density*(-1).
134036Table 3: Summary Statistics by Insurance Status for Ever Married Women Ages 18 to 25 with Live Births
Variable Name 1973 1984
Dependent variable Insured Uninsured All Insured Uninsured All
Child mortality 0.039 0.064 0.053 0.016 0.022 0.018
Kids ever born 1.987 2.426 2.224 1.829 2.078 1.893
Kids currently alive 1.869 2.215 2.056 1.785 2.011 1.842
Independent variables
Individual characteristics
   Insurance 1.000 0.000 0.459 1.000 0.000 0.744
   Age 22.349 22.047 22.186 22.432 22.141 22.357
   Educational Attainment 
     None (omitted) 0.030 0.101 0.069 0.018 0.055 0.028
     Primary education 0.651 0.793 0.728 0.520 0.669 0.558
     Secondary education 0.319 0.105 0.203 0.462 0.276 0.414
   Migration status 0.264 0.278 0.271 0.221 0.259 0.231
Household sanitation characteristics
   No sanitation 0.161 0.325 0.250 0.115 0.226 0.144
   No bath 0.263 0.549 0.418 0.147 0.318 0.191
   No water 0.241 0.498 0.380 0.267 0.420 0.306
Wealth indicators 
     Cement roof 0.047 0.017 0.031 0.050 0.029 0.044
     Wood or tile floor 0.780 0.639 0.704 0.672 0.612 0.657
     Cement or brick walls 0.199 0.085 0.137 0.331 0.190 0.295
     Electric light 0.807 0.457 0.618 0.843 0.641 0.791
     No light 0.018 0.030 0.024 0.024 0.054 0.032
     Electric or gas cooking fuel 0.552 0.257 0.392 0.632 0.387 0.569
     Stove 0.768 0.465 0.604 0.648 0.451 0.598
     Refrigerator 0.277 0.116 0.190 0.465 0.246 0.409
     Radio or television 0.844 0.720 0.777 0.891 0.738 0.852
     Telephone 0.072 0.031 0.050 0.147 0.086 0.131
     Household density 1.381 1.780 1.597 1.208 1.606 1.310   Wealth1 0.522 -0.765 -0.174 0.914 -0.225 0.623
   Wealth2 -0.279 -0.094 -0.179 0.048 0.083 0.057
Community characteristics
   Travel time to San Jose 2.521 5.044 3.886 2.698 3.092 2.799
   Primary health care programs 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.587 0.608 0.592
   Nearest clinic opened after 1973 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.362 0.405 0.373
   Deaths not certified 0.171 0.352 0.269 0.088 0.114 0.095
Number of observations 24411 28785 53196 60143 20697 80840
Notes:
1. The difference between 1973 and 1984 observations are statistically significant for all variables except no stove 
    with a p-value <0.0001. 
2.  The difference between insured and uninsured women in 1973 and 1984 is statistically significant for all variables.Table 4: Regression Results of Insurance Effects on Child Mortality for Ever Married Women Ages 18 to 25 with Live Births
Variable Name
Independent variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
OLS OLS IV OLS OLS IV IV
Indiv Aggreg Indiv Indiv Aggreg Indiv Indiv
Individual characteristics
     Insurance -0.0131 ** -0.0485 ** -0.0535 ** -0.0049 ** 0.0050 0.0004
† 0.0102
†
 (.0010) (.0096) (.0117) (.0011) (.0120) (.0124) (.0122)
    Age 0.0021 ** 0.0070 0.0021 ** 0.0023 **
  (.0003) (.0096) (.0003) (.0004)
    Primary education -0.0231 ** 0.0076 -0.0235 ** -0.0161 **
  (.0033) (.0649) (.0037) (.0052)
     Secondary education -0.0351 ** 0.0180 -0.0358 ** -0.0246 *
  (.0033) (.0776) (.0042) (.0106)
     Migration status 0.0025 * 0.0166 0.0027 0.0024
  (.0014) (.0108) (.0015) (.0016)
Household characteristics
     No sanitation 0.0054 ** 0.0092 0.0055 ** 0.0128
†
  (.0019) (.0243) (.0020) (.0263)
     No bath 0.0066 ** 0.0242 0.0069 ** 0.0296
†
  (.0017) (.0183) (.0017) (.0199)
     No water 0.0062 ** 0.0172 0.0063 ** 0.0285
†
  (.0013) (.0191) (.0014) (.0219)
    Wealth1 -0.0016 ** -0.0015 -0.0019 * -0.0001
†
  (.0005) (.0048) (.0007) (.0050)
    Wealth2 0.0019 ** 0.0037 0.0020 ** 0.0080
†
  (.0005) (.0059) (.0005) (.0060)
Community characteristics
     Travel time to San Jose 0.0063 * 0.0046 * 0.0065 * 0.0049 *
  (.0026) (.0021) (.0026) (.0024)
     Primary health care programs 0.0024 -0.0014 0.0016 0.0019
  (.0074) (.0060) (.0074) (.0068)
     Nearest clinic opened after 1973 -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0036 -0.0036
  (.0039) (.0036) (.0038) (.0038)
     Deaths not certified 0.0496 ** 0.0340 0.0517 ** 0.0378
  (.0168) (.0175) (.0184) (.0197)Year 1984 -0.0441 ** -0.0219 ** -0.0323 ** -0.0240 ** -0.0200 * -0.0240 ** -0.0270 **
 (.0027) (.0036) (.0042) (.0037) (.0090) (.0037) (.0061)
Constant 0.0644 ** 0.0762 ** 0.0846 ** 0.0234 -0.1546 0.0214 ** -0.0118
 (.0016) (.0044) (.0060) (.0066) (.2227) (.0073) (.0138)
Joint significance of county fixed effects p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001
First stage instrument strength p<0.0001 p<0.0001 p<0.0001
Hausman endogeneity test: all coefficients p=0.001 p=0.662 p=0.0750
Hausman endogeneity test: insurance coefficient only p=0.0006 p=0.6626 p=0.2118
N 134036 198 134036 134036 198 134036 134036
Notes:
1.  *significant at 5%; **significant at 1% level (robust clustered standard errors in parentheses)
2. "Indiv" indicates individual-level unit of analysis; "aggreg" indicates county-year aggregated unit of analysis.
3. 
†Regressions 3, 6 and 7 treat insurance as endogenous; Regression 7 also treats no sanitation, no bath, no water, wealth1 and
    wealth2 as endogenous.  County-year interaction dummies are used as the identifying instruments for all  endogenous variables.